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FOREWORD 
With the developing technology, the importance of maritime transportation of goods 
is came forward much more than the previous one daily. Concordantly, the 
importance of chemical cargoes transportation via seas is growing with years. This 
transportation mode indisputibly brings many advantages. Nevertheless, huge 
amount of cargo transportation brings some disadvantages and risks existing before. 
Having greater risks of cargo transportation via seas than before is originated from 
the big amount of the handled cargo.  
One of the most prominent risks of cargo transportation by ships is cargo 
contamination event, which is suffered by either word wide transporting ships or 
bunker barges. In case of any cargo contamination event, as the prejudice is high, it 
constitudes high risky results. Though the results of such events can influence the 
financial condition very deeply, the necessary studies in terms of either academical 
or industrial are not executed yet. This is one of the most motivative factors that 
induced me to propose this study.  
I hope this study, which proposes the all probable root causes of cargo contamination 
event in a novel manner, by applying fuzzy fault tree analysis method, will be a head 
guideline to prevent the contamination as much as possible with cost-benefit analysis 
facility. 
This study was able to be finished succesfully despite such environment, where it is 
almost impossible to find technical and statistical data clearly.  
I consider it is my duty to thank my advisor Asst. Prof. Dr. Y. Volkan AYDOĞDU 
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Özcan ARSLAN and Assoc. Prof. Dr. Serdar KUM for their gentle 
contributions.       
 
 
 
 
June 2014 
 
Yunus Emre ŞENOL 
(Oceangoing Watchkeeping Officer) 
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FAULT TREE ANALYSIS OF CHEMICAL CARGO CONTAMINATION BY 
FUUZY APPROACH 
SUMMARY 
Chemical cargoes are the unquestionably toughest cargoes carried via seas, as they 
require special expertise in terms of handling, storage and transportation aspects. As 
such kind of cargoes may be expolosive, toxic, corossive, contaminant for 
environment and dangerous for human health, they always require fully careful and 
professional operations. Nevertheless, chemical cargoes are needed to be paid 
attention by the ship for some different aspect. One the most important aspects is 
delivering the cargo as pure as in loading port. For protecting the purity of the cargo, 
both physical and chemical specialities of cargo are needed to be protected carefully.  
In case of any chemical cargo contamination originated from ships may result with 
high costs that recourse the shipowner and P&I clubs of the ships. Though a probable 
contamination ends up with serious results, the necessary precautions are not be 
taken academically. There are several and vital precautions to prevent a cargo 
contamination in the industry, which are not adequate and produced as a result of 
systematical cause and effect anaylsis.   
 
For that respects, the industry is passionately looking for a systematic way which 
proposes root causes of cargo contamination briefly and produces a solution way to 
reduce the probability of contamination event. Such kind of needs are motivated us 
to make a novel study which produces all probable root causes of chemical cargo 
contamination event as brief as not previously. Furthermore the proposed approach 
which is named as fuzzy fault tree analysis (FFTA) is suitable to make an extensive 
cost-benefit analysis as it is possible to observe how much the probability of 
contamination event reduces, when any of root causes is eliminated.  
 
Fault tree analysis (FTA) is a systematic way to obtain reliability of complex systems 
both qualitatively and quantitatively. FTA serves estimation about failure probability 
of top event (TE) using generic data. In other words, it uses exact values to for 
estimation of TE failure probability.  
 
Purpose of this study is not only calculating the failure probability of TE by fuzzy 
approach, but also proposing a source for cost-benefit analysis. In other words, the 
main purpose of this study is to identify an appropriate management tool to reduce 
the risk by reducing the probability of the contamination, where the fuzzy approach 
based FTA method is used to determine the existing probability of the contamination. 
In this research, a case study of eliminating one of the root causes of TE is carried 
out. Obtained benefits and costs of this process are also produced subsequently. 
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KĠMYASAL YÜK BOZULMALARININ BULANIK MANTIK YAKLAġIMI 
ĠLE HATA AĞACI ANALĠZĠ 
ÖZET 
Kimyasal yükler taşınması, elleçlenmesi ve yüklenmesi bakımından özel uzmanlık 
gerektirdiği için, deniz taşımacılığında taşınan en zorlu yük grubu olarak kabul edilir. 
Çevreye ve insan sağlığına zararlı olabildikleri için operasyonların son derece 
profesyonel olarak gerçekleştirilmesi gerekmektedir. Ayrıca kimyasal yükler bu 
özelliklerinin yanında son derece dikkate alınması gereken bir özellikleri daha vardır 
ki bu özellik günümüz kimyasal yük taşımacılığında en yüksek riskli kabul edilen 
durumlardan birisidir. Yüklerin yükleme limanındaki kadar saf ve bozulmamış 
şekilde tahliye limanında teslimatı son derece mühimdir. Yüklerin hem kimyasal 
hem de fiziksel özelliklerinin özenle korunması gemi sorumluluğunda olan bir şarttır. 
Olası bir yük bozulması durumunda donatan ve geminin P&I Club sigortası çok 
yüksek meblalarda tazminatla yüz yüze gelebilmektedir.  
 
Kimyasal yükler kirlenme (contamination), oksitlenme, poimerleşme, renk 
bozulması şeklinde bozulurlar. Gemi tanklarına alınan kimyasal yükün analizi 
sonucunda yükün yapısında başka kimyasal ürünlere yada tank yıkamasında 
kullanılabilecek olan deniz suyuna ait kalıntılar bulunması ve bu kalıntıların yükte 
oluşturduğu kimyasal kontaminasyona kirlenme denir. Örneğin deniz suyundan 
kaynaklanan kirlenme genelde deniz suyunun içerisinde bulunan Cl-1 (klor) 
atomunun ürünün yapısında bulunabilecek olan ve zayıf bir bağa sahip OH-1 
(hidroksit) grubuyla yer değiştirmesi sonucu gerçekleşir.  Örneğin kimyasal formülü 
CH3OH olan metil alkol, klor yani tuzdan tam arındırılmamış bir tanka alınırsa zayıf 
bağa sahip OH-1 grubu deniz suyundaki Cl-1 atomuyla yer değişerek, formülü CH3Cl 
olan metil klorüre (methyl chloride) dönüşür. Benzer şekilde daha önce organik 
yapılı ürün taşınmış ve tam arındırılmamış tanka alınan metil alkol yapısındaki bu 
zayıf bağlı OH-1 grubu önceki yükten kalmış olabilecek CH-3  grubuyla yer değişir ve 
yükün kimyasal özelliği yine korunamamış olunur. 
 
Oksidasyon, yüklerin O2 (oksijen) ile tepkimeye girerek kimyasal özelliklerinin 
değişmesi anlamına gelir. Bu tür bozulmalarda yükün kimyasal özelliğinin 
değişeceği gibi patlamalara da sebebiyet verebilir. Örneğin, etil, eter gibi eter sınıfı 
yükler O2 ile tepkimeye girdiklerinde patlama tehlikesi oluşturan peroksit oluşumuna 
neden olurlar. Bu durum da yalnızca yük bozulması ile sonuçlanmayıp, geminin 
kaybına ve büyük çevre kirliliklerine neden olabilmektedir. Örneğin, etil, eter gibi 
eter sınıfı yükler O2 ile tepkimeye girdiklerinde patlama tehlikesi oluşturan peroksit 
oluşumuna neden olurlar. Bu durumun da önüne geçebilmek için yapılması geren 
mutlak iş  yüke bu reaksiyonu yavaşlatıcı inhibitör eklemek ve  tanklara padding 
yapmaktır.  
xxii 
 
Padding, gaz, buhar yada özel sıvılarla yapılabilen ve yükün tank içerisinde yüzeyini 
kapatarak oksijenle temasını kesmeye yönelik işlemdir. Gaz ile yapılan padding, 
kimyasal tankerlerde inertleme sisteminin fonksiyonlarından bir diğeridir. 
 
Polimerleşme, aynı tip moleküllerin birbirine yapışarak daha büyük bir molekül 
oluşturmasıdır. Belirli hidrokarbon karışımları ışık, ısı, hava veya başka 
materyallerle (pas gibi) temaslarda zamana bağlı olarak hızlı bir şekilde 
polimerleşmeye meyillidir. Bu tür reaksiyonlar genelde  yoğunlaşma yada katılaşma 
yönünde olur. Polimerleşen yüklerin bir kısmı kendi kendine reaksiyona girebilir. Bu 
tür yüklere de ―self reactive‖ yükler denmektedir. 
Polimerleşme reaksiyonları sıcaklıkla doğru orantılı olarak artar. Polimerleşmeyi 
geciktirmek için bazı reaksiyon önleyicileri, (inhibitör) yüklemeden önce yüke 
katılmış olmalıdır. Ancak inhibitörlerin de aktif çalışma sıcaklık aralıkları vardır. 
Sıcaklığın fazlaca artması inhibitörü etkisiz kılacaktır. 
 
Kimyasal tankerlerde taşınan yükler yüksek saflık ve kalitededirler. Bu yüzden 
yükün renginde gerçekleşecek değişiklik bozulma manasına gelebilmektedir. 
Kimyasalların görünümü genelde saydam ya da yarı saydam olduğu için bulanıklık 
ya da beyazlaşma istenmeyen bir karışımın varlığına işarettir. Ürünlerin farklı 
sebeplerden dolayı renklerinde gerçekleşen bozulmaya renk bozulması 
(decolorızatıon) denmektedir.  En çok karşılaşılan renk bozulması sebebi tankta ya 
da devrelerde bulunabilecek pastan kaynaklanmaktadır. Renk bozulması genellikle 
çözelti halinde bulunan yüklerde yaşanır, alkali ve aminlerde yaşanan renk bozulması 
en çok karşılaşılan yük bozulması durumlarının başında gelir. Bunun en bilinen 
örneği de kostik soda çözeltisinde yaşanabilen renk bozulması durumudur. Böyle bir 
üründe yaşanacak renk bozulması, ürünün çok küçük bir pastan bile etkilenerek 
tamamen kahverengine yakın bir renk alması sebebine dayanabilir.  Kostik soda 
endüstride temizlik maddelerinde, sabun üretiminde, kağıt hammaddesi gibi 
üretimlerde kullanılır. Buradan da anlaşılacağı gibi tüketici sabunu ya da kağıdı 
beyaz görmek ister ve tercihini bu yönde kullanır. Bu yüzden renk bozulması sonucu 
kostik soda kullanılış amacının dışına çıkar. Böyle bir off spec durumunda tercih 
edilen yol genelde renk bozulmasına uğrayan ürün kimyasal olarak bir değişime 
uğramadığı için yan ürün olarak değerlendirilmesidir ve bozulmamış bir kostik 
sodadan edilmesi beklenen kardan eksik kalan kısım taşıyandan yani taşıyanın kulüp 
sigortasından temin edilmesi şeklinde olur. 
 
Bu sebeple, kimyasal yük taşımacılık sektörü gemi kaynaklı yük bozulması 
olaylarının kök sebeplerini ortaya koyan ve önlenmesine yönelik tavsiyeler sunan 
özgün bir çalışmaya ihtiyaç duymaktadır. Kimyasal yük taşımacılık sektörünün bu 
yöndeki ivedi ihtiyacı, yük bozulması olayının kök sebeplerini daha önce olmadığı 
kadar açık ve derinlemesine inceleyen bu çalışmayı yapmamızdaki ana motivasyon 
kaynağıdır. Çalışmada sunduğumuz fault tree analysis (FTA) metodunun tercih 
edilme sebebi kök sebepleri ortaya koymak ve ana olay olan yük bozulması olayının 
ihtimalinin hesaplanmasıdır.  
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Bu hesaplama için kök sebep olaylarının ihtimallerinin bilinmesi gerekmektedir. 
Hata ağacı analizi yeterli bilgi ve raporlamanın olmadığı bu durumlarda uzman 
tahminlerinin sözel olarak alındığı ve metodolojik dönüşümle sayısal ihtimallerin 
elde edildiği fuzzy yöntemiyle desteklenmiştir. Bu sayede sadece kök sebeplerin 
analiz edilmesi ve yük bozulması olayının ihtimalinin hesaplanması değil, ayrıca kök 
sebeplerin yok edilmesi ile ana olay ihtimalinin düşmesi sonucunda fayda-maliyet 
analizi yapılması imkanı da sunmaktadır.          
 
Çalışmada sunduğumuz örnek fayda-maliyet hesaplamasına göre gemilerde yük 
bozılması kök sebeplerinin elimine edilmesi ile yük bozulması ihtimali azaltılacağı 
için taşıma firmasının kar etmesi mümkün olabilmektedir. Bu durum zarardan kar 
edilmesi olarak düşünülse dahi, bir geminin günlük maliyet hesabına olası yük 
bozulmasından edilecek yaklaşık zarara göre maliyet eklenmesi söz konusu olduğu 
için, bu çalışma ışığında yapılacak iyileştirmeler sayesinde geminin günlük 
maliyetlerini azaltmanın mümkün olduğu ortaya konmuştur. 
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1 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Chemical tankers are specialized ships, which are capable of carrying diverse 
chemical cargoes. There are some distinguished specialities of chemical tankers than 
the others. Basically, chemical tankers have separated and individual cargo tanks, 
which are connected to separated cargo lines and cargo pumps that facilitate the 
carriage of more than one parcel cargo. Additionally, as the the chemical cargoes 
have diverse characteristics, the tank coating materials are specialized for chemical 
tankers and individual for the purpose of chemical cargo carriage. Eventually, there 
are thausands of chemical cargoes, can be transportated on board, which encouraged 
the industry to construct much more specialized ships having the capability of wide 
diversity cargo carriage as much as possible.      
Obviously, chemical cargoes are the unquestionably toughest cargoes carried via 
seas, as they require special expertise in terms of handling, storage and transportation 
aspects. As such kind of cargoes may be expolosive, toxic, corossive, contaminant 
for environment and dangerous for human health, they always require fully careful 
and professional operations. Nevertheless, chemical cargoes are needed to pay 
special attention by the ship for some different aspects. One the most important 
aspects is delivering the cargo as pure as in loading port. For protecting the purity of 
the cargo, both physical and chemical specialities of cargo are needed to protect 
carefully.  
In case of any chemical cargo contamination originated from ships may result with 
high costs that recourse the shipowner and P&I clubs of the ships. Ship owners and 
the clubs are making extensive researches to minimize the risk of cargo 
contamination for years. After the extensive researches some preventive checklists 
are published by P&I clubs. These checklists which address only instant operational 
precautions may be effective in short term. Having only such kind of checklists are 
not satisfactory to prevent the contamination as much as possible for long term. 
2 
Moreover, there is an extensive guide for tank cleaning operation, which describes 
the specific cleaning operations for each type of cargoes.  
Since the guide is the most important advisor for industry, the most important 
preventive action is a satisfactory cleaning operation. Therefore, even the guide 
offers only well qualified cleaning operations, it is not be assumed as a fully 
comprehensive preventive source for contamination. Otherwise, risk assessment 
studies are carried on by the ships before cargo related operations by revealing the 
risks to reduce them. These kinds of assessments can be used for only specific cases 
and conditions. Also the purposes of risk assessment studies are to reveal the all risks 
of relevant operations. Thus, such studies might not prevent a cargo contamination 
event solely, because contamination events need much more comrehensive studies as 
the causes of a contamination are very complex and radical.      
The industry is passionately looking for a systematic way which proposes all 
probable root causes of cargo contamination briefly and produces a solution way to 
reduce the probability of a contamination event. Such kind of needs are motivated us 
to make this novel study which produces all probable root causes of chemical cargo 
contamination event as brief as not previously. Furthermore the proposed approach 
by using fault tree analysis (FTA) is suitable for making an extensive cost-benefit 
analysis. By FTA it is possible to observe how much the probability of 
contamination event reduces, when any of root causes is eliminated. For instance, 
according to our case study, for our sample company we deduced a cargo 
contamination event as of occurance in 3, 77 years. When we eliminate a root cause 
of the contamination event, the probability of contamination decreases to 4, 02 years. 
This case study shows the profit of such elimination is 124.000 USD (United States 
Dollars) for four years.  
Fault tree analysis (FTA) is a systematic way to obtain reliability of complex systems 
both qualitatively and quantitatively. FTA serves an estimation about failure 
probability of top event (TE) using generic data. In other words, it uses exact values 
for an estimation of TE failure probability. For that respect, we need exact values of 
all probable root causes of the cargo contamination event. However, as there are only 
limited records and inadequate data about these root causes, the conventional FTA 
method can not solve our problem.  
3 
Thus, to obtain probability values of the root causes, we need a methodological way, 
which should be embeded into FTA like fuzzy approach. For that respect, in this 
study, fault tree analysis method by fuzzy approach is employed.  
This method introduces the system analysts to quantifiy the occurance probability of 
events more accurately by reducing the uncertainty, where the obtaining of 
occurance probability is impossible.  
1.1 Purpose of Thesis 
Chemical cargo contamination is growing problem in chemical cargo transportation 
industry. Regardless of taking into consideration the probability of contamination 
occurance, it comprises very high risk, as the result is very hazardous. Though the 
results of cargo contamination are very important, the existing preventive studies are 
not sufficient. There are some limited checklists without presenting root cause of 
cargo contamination events briefly, published by some foremost P&I clubs and 
management companies’ superficial checklists. One of the most useful checlists is 
tanker contamination checklist published by UK P&I club.  
Furthermore, preventive actions are determined and carried out by the officers on 
board, which may be based on incorrect and insufficient informations. Therefore the 
industry needs a preventive system that has common validation. In this study, a 
systematical and novel approach is proposed by aiming decline of contaminaton 
probability. FTA of cargo contamination by fuzzy approach enables us to obtain 
quantitative values of TE’s causes, which makes estimation of TE possible.  
Purpose of this study is not only calculating the failure probability of TE by fuzzy 
approach, but also proposing a source for cost-benefit analysis. In other words, is to 
identify an appropriate management tool to reduce the risk by reducing the 
probability of the contamination, where the fuzzy approach based FTA method is 
used to determine the existing probability of the contamination. In this research, a 
case study of eliminating one of the root causes of TE is carried out. Obtained 
benefits and costs of this process are also produced subsequently.  
One of the most important steps of cost-benefit analysis is to determine preventive 
actions properly.  
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The better technical analysis of a failure is carried out well, the less failure occurs. 
For that respect, some prominent precautions are explained in this study.       
1.2 Literature Review 
FTA is systematic approach to estimate safety and reliability of a complex system, 
qualitatively as well as quantitatively (Wang et al. 2013, p. 1). In the light of this 
approach, the method can identfy weaknesses, propose possible upgrates and predict 
behaviour. For that respect, FTA is used in many fields, such as chemical process, 
safety assessment, nuclear power etc. studies.  
As the conventional FTA is inadequate, more detailed studies are performed by using 
fuzzy set theory in FTA. The trailblazer research on this field was performed by 
Tanaka et al. (1983), which evalualted the probabilities of BEs (Basic Event) as 
trapezoidal fuzzy numbers and applied the fuzzy extension principle to determine the 
probability of BEs. Based on this study, further researches were carried out by Misra 
and Weber (Misra and Weber, 1990).  
They proposed an evaluation system based on possibility distribution related with 
BEs and a fuzzy algebra to combine them. In the light of these studies, Singer 
analysed fuzzy reliability by applying L-R (left-right) fuzzy numbers (1990). For the 
purpose of facilitating his analysis, Chen and Mon proposed a method by taking into 
consideration the failure probabilities of BEs, based on triangular fuzzy numbers 
(1993).   
Lin and Wang carried out further extensive studies and proposed a method based on 
FFTA, which can calculate the failure probability and possibility measures 
simultaneously (1997). Moreover, Cai et al. (1991) and Huang et al. (2004) adopted a 
theory based on possibility theory to analyse the FTA structure.  
One of the most revolutionary studies was carried out by Ping et al., which can deal 
with the some obstructions of conventional FTA by using possibilistic measures and 
fuzzy logic (2007).  
There are many milestone researches, which explain how much the BEs are 
important in FFTA studies. Tanaka et. al. propesed an improvement index to evaluate 
the importance of BEs (1983).  
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Furuta and Shiraishi developed a group of value which repsesent the fuzzy 
membership functions to determine the importance of BEs (1984). Suresh et. al. 
propsed a theory usind euclidean distance to determine the importance of BEs. 
All studies mentioned above indicate that the FFTA has very extensive usage area in 
many engineering fields for years. However, application of FFTA to determine the 
importance of BEs in cargo contamination FTA structure is not reported before. 
When it is considered how much risk the cargo contamination events comprise, such 
kind of approach for preventing the probable cargo contamination is inevitably 
necessary.           
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2.  MATERIALS AND METHODS   
2.1 Fault Tree Analysis 
FTA is a systematic risk analysis method that deals with the occurance of an 
undesired event. After the identification of the root causes of the specific problem, 
the probability of an unwanted incident is determined (Goodman, 1988, p.3).  
Schematics of a fault tree starts with the ―top event‖ and related logic events are 
shown in Figure 2.1. In most cases, significant events are preferred because of its 
criticality. The occurance of the reasons is divided into the branches step by step. 
The analysis goes on at each stage, until the basic reasons or boundary conditions are 
reached. There is no need a further development for root causes. The analysis goes 
on at each level until the basic reasons or analysis lower limits are reached. If a root 
basic cause is not required more development, this is displayed as a circle. If there is 
no available data of an event, a diamond symbol is used to represent this as an 
―undeveloped event‖. Also, a triangular symbol is used to ―transfer‖ that indicates 
the tree is developed for further trees (Stapelberg, 2008, p. 47). 
In principal, logical operators as ―OR‖ and ―AND‖ gates are used in the fault-tree 
diagrams. Output of an AND gate is influenced by the combination of all input 
events. The AND gate can be described as an intersection of sets which contain all 
input events. Differently, output of an OR gate depends on whether one of the input 
events occur. The OR gate can be described as a union of the sets contain all input 
events (Stapelberg, 2008, p. 53).  
Logic symbols used in fault tree analysis are shown in Figure 2.1.  
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Figure 2.1 : Logic symbols used in FTA ( Iverson et.al.). 
Fault Tree Analysis is developed into six steps (Dhillon, 2008, p.6) 
Step 1.  Definition of problem and boundary conditions. Describing the criticallity of 
the TOP-event with the physical borders, initial conditions and limitation of external 
loads.  
Step2. Construction model of the Fault Tree Anlaysis. Describing the failure events 
and assessment of failure events. 
Step 3.Establishment of the minimal cut and path sets. 
Step 4. Qualitative analysis of the fault tree 
Step 5. Quantitative evaluation of the logic model. Probability of the TOP-event and 
reliability of the basic events. 
Step 6. Reporting 
2.1.1 Notation and quantification of the probability of the logic gates 
Let 0 ( )Q t is the propbability of the top event occurs at time t, q ( )i t  probability of the 
basic event i occurs at time t. 0 ( )Q t  is the propbability of the minimal cut set j fails 
at time t 
Let stands for the basic event i occurs at time t.   
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AND Gate 
Let 1q ( ) P(E ( ))it t  for i=1,2. (2.1) 
Top event probability 0 ( )Q t  is 
0 1 2 1 1 1 2( ) P(E ( ) ( )) ( ( ) ( )) ( ) ( )Q t t E t P E t E t q t q t    (2.2) 
If there is a single AND gate with n events; 
0
1
( ) ( )
n
j
j
Q t q t


 
(2.3) 
OR Gate 
Let 1q ( ) P(E ( ))it t  for i=1,2. 
 
Top event probability 0 ( )Q t  is 
0 1 2 1 1 1 2( ) P(E ( ) ( )) ( ( )) ( ( )) ( ) ( )Q t t E t P E t P E t E t E t     
1 2 1 2 1 2q ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 (1 ( )) (1 ( ))t q t q t q t q t q t        
(2.4) 
If there is a single AND gate with n events; 
0
1
( ) 1 (1 ( ))
n
j
j
Q t q t

  
 
(2.5) 
2.1.2 Cut set assessment 
A mininal cut set fails if all basic events fail simultaneously. The probability of the 
cut set j fails at time t is  
,
1
( ) ( )
n
j j i
i
t q t

  (2.6) 
2.1.3 Top event probability 
Minimal cut sets related to the top event by an OR gate. Therefore, at least one of the 
minimal cut sets fail the TOP event occurs.  The probability of TOP event is   
0
1
( ) 1 (1 ( ))
k
j
j
Q t t

    (2.7) 
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In the traditional fault tree analysis (FTA) fault probabilities are conducted by 
appyling the crisp data for each basic event (BE) of components in a system. 
However, determining the rate of faults and probabilties for each perfect component 
in the multiple systems is quite hard. Also, a quantitative analysis is difficult for each 
BEs to find the absolute  probabilites. On the other hand, crisp data have the 
difficulty to express the nature of vague values. 
2.2 Proposed Approach: Fuzzy Fault Tree Analysis (FFTA) of Cargo 
Contamination 
In case of having lack or inadequate data, there is a necessity of expert judgement 
incorporation to risk analysis. A structure establishment is proposed, based on fuzzy 
set theory which is capable of converting expert’s linguistic judgements into 
quantitative results. Firstly, expert judgements are assigned for BEs whose failure 
rates are indefinite. These assessments are usually in fuzzy number form. Secondly, 
the subsequent step is aggregation process. In this stage, experts’ qualitative opinions 
for basic events with indefinite failure rates are aggregated.  
Applying appropriate methodology, defuzzification process is executed by 
converting the experts’ judgements, which will be mentioned anymore as fuzzy 
possibility, to crisp possibility. Thirdly, crisp possibility values are converted into the 
failure probability. After this stage, MCSs and TEs are predicted. In the last step 
MCSs are ranked from most effective one to less. 
2.2.1 Separation of hazards 
In this stage the BEs is to be separated as; known failure rate events and unknown 
failure rate events. If any failure rate of the event is known, it could be calculated 
without fuzzy approach. In this study, as the failure rate of all BEs are unknown, 
fuzzy approaches will be employed for all BEs. 
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2.2.2 Obtaining failure probability of hazards with unknown failure rate 
Mostly, the failure probability of an event is obtained by three main methods named 
as; 
 Statistical method. 
 Extrapolation method. 
 Expert judgement method. 
Statistical method uses experimental data with direct test for calculating the 
probability.  
The extrapolation method involves the use of model prediction and similar condition 
or using standard reliability handbook (Lavasani et al., 2011, p.7) 
The expert judgement method depends on the specialists’ estimation of probability.  
2.2.3 Rating stage 
In this stage, the experts produce their own subjective opinions for each BEs. When 
there is vague data on some events because of limited sources or physical limitations, 
to eliminate the ambiguity, expert elicitation is executed (Rausand and Hoyland, 
2004, p.6). Expert elicitation is a scientific consensus methodology, which is 
preferred for rare events. Expert elicitation allows us to use the parameters that are 
related with the experts, which is named as ―educated guess‖. Moreover this 
methodology offers the experts to make estimation related with the only their own 
province and results the uncertainties as quantitative probabilities.        
 This technique is used in many disciplines with time. Psychology, mathematics, 
Bayesian statistics and decision analysis are some examples of expert elicitation 
method application fields for obtaining stochastic data. Quantification of subjective 
probabilities is employed in a number of circumstances (Korta et al., 1996, p.5). 
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 Evidence is incomple because it cannot be reasonably obtained.  
 Data exists only from similar situations  
 There are conflicting model sor data sources. 
 Scaling up from experiments to target physical processes is not direct   
According to Ford and Sterman (1998), judgements of experts are influenced by their 
perspectives and objectives. For that respect, it is almost impossible make objective 
judgements and selecting the experts is needed to be paid attention. Another 
important consideration is whether we select a homogeneous expert group, or 
heterogeneous expert group. Homogenous group consist of same work interested 
experts i.e. only workers.  
Heterogeneous expert group consist of diverse work interested experts i.e. both 
scientist and workers. The difference of judgements in homogeneous groups is 
expected smaller than the heterogeneous group. Obtaining diverse judgements and 
different experimental opinion by heterogeneous group is more advantageous than 
the homogeneous group judgement. The essence of these, basic criterions of 
assigning the experts based on learning period of an expert and knowledge depend on 
the person’s experiences in specific domain. Thus, this situation will influence the 
experts’ judgements, assessments and analytical behaviours.  
In this study, heterogeneous expert judgement is employed for calculating the 
probability of vague events and weighting scores of experts, which are symbolized 
by ―w‖. Determining criterions of weighting factors of experts are shown in Table 
2.1. Experts’ judgements rating is employed with linguistic terms. Objective of this 
step is to obtain the experts’ judgements for each BEs.  
According to Zadeh (1965), ―The concept of linguistic term is very useful in dealing 
with situations, which are too ill defined or too complex to be described in 
conventional quantitative expression‖ (p. 3). 
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Table 2.1 : Expert weighting determining criterions. 
Parameters Classification Score 
Professional 
Position 
Academician 5 
Company operations manager 4 
Company deck inspector 3 
Master 2 
Chief officer 1 
Sea service 
time  
(year) 
≥16 5 
11 - 15 4 
6 - 10 3 
3 – 5 2 
≤ 2 1 
Shore service 
time (year) 
≥26 5 
16 - 25 4 
11 - 15 3 
6 - 10 2 
≤ 5 1 
Educational 
level 
PhD 5 
Master 4 
Bachelor 3 
HND 2 
School Level 1 
2.2.4 Aggregating stage 
Experts could produce diverse judgements, as they have different opinion depending 
on experience and knowledge. The matter is aggregating the all judgements and 
obtaining a consensus. Hsu and Chen (1994) suggested an algorithm regarding 
aggregating the both homogeneous and heterogeneous group’s judgements. 
Assume that each expert ( 1,2,..., )kE k M  states his/her own opinion in linguistic 
terms, which are predetermined with specific context. The linguistic terms are 
converted into fuzzy numbers with appropriate algorithm explained below.  
 Degree of agreement (degree of similarity) 
― S ‖ symbol will symbolize the similarity degree of pair of experts opinions stated 
with ―R‖ symbol. When (R ,R ) [0,1]uv u vS  , we will calculate the similarity degree of 
vE  and uE  experts’ Ru  and R v  opinions. With this approach 1 2 3 4R (r , r , r , r )u u u u u  
and 1 2 3 4R (r , r , r , r )v v v v v  are two standard trapezoidal fuzzy numbers.   
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Similarity rate between these two experts’ opinion is calculated with similarity 
function, stated below; 
4
1
1
(R ,R ) 1
4
u v ui vi
i
S r r

    (2.8) 
Where (R ,R ) [0,1]u vS  . The greater value of (R ,R )u vS , the more similarity 
between these two fuzzy numbers. When the value of (R ,R )u vS  equals to 1, it 
means the opinions of these experts are same.  
 Average Agreement degree ( )uAA E  of the experts 
( 1,2,...,N)uE u   (2.9) 
1
1
( ) (R ,R )
1
N
u u v
u v
v
AA E S
N 



  (2.10) 
―N‖ symbolizes total number of the experts.  
 Relative Agreement degree calculation, ( )uRA E  of the experts 
( 1,2,...,N)uE u   as 
1
( )
( )
(E )
u
u N
u
u
AA E
RA E
AA



 
(2.11) 
 Consensus Coefficient (CC) degre estimation, ( )uCC E  of expert 
( ) . ( ) (1 ) ( )u u uCC E w E RA E      
(2.12) 
Where   is a relaxation factor and (0 1)  .   Indicates the importance of 
( )uw E  over ( )uRA E . If 0  , that shows the evaluation of experts, which is made 
by the researcher is omitted. When 1  , consensus degree coefficient of expert is 
assumed same with expert importance weighting.  
According to Lavasani et al. (2011) ―Consensus degree coefficient of each expert is a 
good measure for evaluating the relative worthiness of each expert’s opinion‖ (p. 
35). It is the decision maker’s responsibility to rate the   value.  
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 Aggregation of experts’ opinion, 
AGR   
1 1 2 2(E ) (E ) ... (E )AG M MR CC R CC R CC R        (2.13) 
2.2.5 Defuzzificaion process 
Purpose of the defuzzification process is to obtain measurable results in fuzzy logic. 
According to Zhao and Govind defuzzification problems emerge from the 
application of fuzzy control to the industrial process (Zhao and Govind, 1991, p. 3). 
defuzzification of fuzzy numbers is very important process for making decisions in 
fuzzy issues. In this study, for defuzzification process, centre of area method is 
selected, which is the most commonly used one and developed by Sugeno in 1985 
(Sugeno, 1999).      
*
( )
( )
i
i
x xdx
X
x




 (2.14) 
Where *X is defuzzified output,  ( )i x  is aggregated membership function and x is 
output variable.  
The formula given above may show triangular and trapezoidal fuzzy numbers. 
Defuzzification process of fuzzy numbers can be explained as follows: 
32
1 2
32
1 2
3
2 1 3 2*
1 2 3
31
2 1 3 2
1
(r )
3
rr
r r
rr
r r
r xx r
xdx xdx
r r r r
X r r
r xx r
dx dx
r r r r


 
   


 
 
 
 (2.15) 
Defuzzification of trapezoidal fuzzy numbers is explained below: 
32 4
1 2 3
32 4
1 2 3
4
2 2
2 1 4 3* 4 3 4 3 1 2 1 2
4 3 2 11 4
2 1 4 3
(r ) (r )1
3
rr r
r r r
rr r
r r r
r xx r
xdx xdx xdx
r r r r r r r r r r
X
r r r rx r r x
dx xdx dx
r r r r

 
      
 
   
 
 
  
  
 
(2.16) 
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2.2.6 Transformation of crisp failure possibility (CFP) into failure probability  
As it is mentioned before for some issues, it is not possible to find related statistical 
fault data. This problem can be solved by converting crisp failure possibility (CFP) 
into failure probability (FP) form. This is possible with following formula, which is 
developed by Onisawa (Onisawa, 1998; Onisawa and Nishiwaki, 1998; Onsiawa, 
1988; Onisawa, 1990; Onsiawa, 1996) 
1
, 0
10
0, 0
K
CFP
FP
CFP
 
 
  
  
 (2.17) 
Where, 
1
31
2.301
CFP
K
CFP
   
   
  
 
(2.18) 
2.2.7 Calculation of all minimal cut sets (MCSs) and top event (TE) occurrence 
Minimal cut set (MCS) is a combination of BEs, which leads to occurrence of top 
event (TE). This combination is the minimal one and occurrences of all BEs 
containing the MCS are necessary for TE occurrence. In other words, in the 
combination, if any BE symbolizing a fault does not occur, the TE will not occur. 
Each fault trees has limited number of MCSs, which are special to TE. Occurrence 
probability of TE is obtained by Eq. 3.19. 
1 2 1 2( ) ( ... ) ( ) ( )NP TE P MCS MCS MCS P MCS P MCS     
1 2 1 3... ( ) ( ( ) ( ( )NP MCS P MCS MCS P MCS MCS    
1
1 2...( ( )...)... ( 1) ( ... )
N
i j NP MCS MCS P MCS MCS MCS
    
 
(2.19) 
Where, ( )iP MCS the occurrance probability of MCSi and N is the number of MCS. 
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2.2.8 Minimal cut sets ranking 
One of the most important outputs of FTA is the group of importance measure, 
which are calculated for obtaining the probability of TE. The importance measures 
enable us to introduce how much the each MCS influences the probability of TE. 
There are two different importance measurement methods. These methods are 
presciribed below: 
Fussell-Vesely Importance Measure (F-VIM) is the indicator of MCSs contribution 
to TE probability.  
F-VI measure can be calculated for each MCS, which allows us to prioritize the 
MCSs depending on the impact of each MCS to TE probability. F-VI is calculated by 
summing all the MCSs of TE involving the paticular events (Lavasani et al., 2011, 
p.36). This value is applied to MCSs to obtain the importance of each MCS. When 
we consider (t)iQ  is contribution of each MCS to failure probability and (t)SQ  is the 
probability of failure of TE due to all MCSs, F-VI measure can be calculated as 
follows: 
(t)
(t)
(t)
FV i
i
S
Q
I
Q
  (2.20) 
Another measurement method is calculating the risk reduction worth (RRW). RRW 
measures the decline of the TE probability, when the relevant MCS is assumed as not 
occurs. RRW is also named as top decrease sensitivity, as omitting the probability of 
MCS will result maximum decline on TE probability.  
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3.  STRUCTURE OF CARGO CONTAMINATION 
3.1 Cargo Contamination 
Chemical cargoes are the unquestionably toughest cargoes carried via seas, as they 
require special expertise in terms of handling, storage and transportation aspects. As 
such kind of cargoes may be expolosive, toxic, corossive, contaminant for 
environment and dangerous for human health, they always require fully careful and 
professional operations. Nevertheless, chemical cargoes are needed to be paid 
attention by the ship for some different aspect. One the most important aspects is 
delivering the cargo as pure as in loading port. For protecting the purity of the cargo, 
both physical and chemical specialities of cargo are needed to be protected carefully.  
Any deviation on cargo specialities may indicate cargo contamination, which is 
named in industry as ―cargo off spec‖. As price of these sensitive chemical cagoes 
are high, in case of cargo contamination, many owners have judicial problems that 
may end up with high compensations. Table 3.1 indicates European price ranges of 
some most transported chemicals without custom duty.  
Table 3.1 : European price ranges of some chemical cargoes. 
Cargo Prices 
Acrylonitrile Butadiene Styrene 3030 - 3125 USD / TON 
Ethylene 1760 - 1850 USD / TON 
Polyethylene 1590 - 1800 USD / TON 
Fatty Alcohols 1300 - 1350 USD / TON 
Acetic Acid 600 - 700 USD / TON 
Caustic Soda 430 - 450 USD / TON 
According to 2014-second quarter price lists, 20.000 DWT stainless steel chemical 
tanker’s value is 28 million USD (Url-1). As it is seen, sometimes ships may carry 
much more expensive cargo than ship’s value. As a case study, we can choose 
Acrylonitrile Butadiene Styrene for loading a chemical tanker of 10.000 ton capacity.  
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That means the ship will carry cargo, which costs approximately 30 million USD, 
which means total cost of cargo is much more expensive than ship’s price.     
For that respect, cargo contamination is very important problem, which is to be paid 
attention to prevent such kind of loses. 
Cargo contamination may occur by different ways, depending on the cargo’s 
specialities. In this study, we describe the types of cargo contaminations by aming to 
prevent all cause of each contamination types.  
3.1.1 Contamination 
Cargoes are analysed after loading operation to determine if there is any contaminant 
in the cargo or not. Though contamination is used as synonym of cargo off spec, the 
exact meaning of contamination is existence of any other component inside of the 
chemical structure. The contaminants may defect the cargo’s not only physical but 
also chemical charasteristics.  
For example, methyl alcohol (CH3OH) which is one of the most sensitive cargoes 
requires a very clean tank and if seawater exists, methyl alcohol will be 
contaminated. Chlorine (Cl
-1
) inside the seawater displaces with hydroxyl group 
(OH
-1
) which has a weak bond and this results existing of methyl chloride (CH3Cl). 
After such kind of contamination the cargoes both physical and chemical 
characteristics are defected.  
3.1.2 Oxidation 
Oxidation is common name of reactions exist with oxygen molecule (O2). When 
combustion of a wooden part is named as oxidation, which is exothermal reaction, 
oxidation of iron (rusting) is not an exothermal reaction. In other words, oxidation 
reaction may not be exothermal.  
Some chemical cargoes, which are members of ethyl and ether chemical families, are 
very sensitive to O2. Because of O2 reaction with such kind of cargoes, peroxides and 
very excessive heat are produced, which is named as flameless burning. Such kind of 
contamination may cause not only cargo off spec, but also loss of the ship.    
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3.1.3 Polymerization 
Polymerization is a process in which relatively smaller molecules, called monomers, 
combine chemically to produce large molecule chain, called polymer. In other words, 
polymerization is chemical transition of monomer material to polymer. 
Polymerization affects the material’s elasticity or ability to form fibres. After 
polymerization, both physical and chemical characteristics of material are changed.  
Table 3.2 : List of polymerize cargoes. 
Acrylic Acid Chloroprene Isobutyl Acrylate 
Acrylonitrile Decyl Acrylate Isoprene 
Benzyl Chloride Etyhl Acrylate Methyle Acrylate 
Butyl Acrylate 2-Ethyl Hexyl 
Acrylate 
Metyhl Acrylic 
Vinyl Acetate 2-Hydro Xyethyl 
Acrylate 
Styrene Monomer 
Vinyl Chloride Vinylidene Chloride Butyl Methacrylate 
Some hydrocarbon mixtures are tend to polymerize quickly when interacted with 
light, heat, athmosphere or any other factors like rust. Table 3.2 indicates the list of 
cargoes, which tend to polymerize easily.   
3.1.4 Decolorization 
All types of chemical cargoes carried by chemical tankers have high purity degree 
and quality. For that reason, even the amount of contaminant is very little, the purity 
degree of cargo will degrease, which means a decline of quality.  
Alkalic and amine solution cargoes tend to be decolorized. For example, caustic soda 
is very sensitive to rust, which is affected easily by even small rusty parts of cargo 
lines and tanks.       
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3.2 FTA Structure of Chemical Cargo Contamination 
3.2.1 Ship transportation 
Ship Transportation event is the top event of this study. Chemical cargoes could be 
contaminated during any other process of transportation than the shipping. As we 
propose a FTA of chemical cargo contamination by ships, other transportation forms 
will not be mentioned in this study. Figure 3.1 – 3.2 and 3.3 indicate the all FTA 
structure of cargo contamination event. 
Ship Transportation event is divided into two events as Operational and Structural, 
which are lined by ―OR‖ gate. Because each of them can cause the ship 
transportation event independently.  
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Figure 3.1 : FTA structre of chemical cargo contamination event part 1. 
The symbols of ―A‖, ―B‖, ―C‖ in Figure 3.1 are indicating that there are transfers out 
of trees which are indicated in Figure 3.2 and 3.3 separately. Main purpose of this 
application is to indicate the trees while fitting them in the page.
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Figure 3.2 : FTA structure of chemical cargo contamination event part 2. 
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Figure 3.3 : FTA structure of chemical cargo contamination event part 3. 
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3.2.1.1 Primary faults 
Primary faults event is intermediate event, which is connected with monitoring event 
by ―AND‖ gate.  
A Operational 
Operational faults event is intermediate event, which is connected with structural 
event by ―OR‖ gate. Primary event is divided into segregation, cargo handling 
equipment maintenance and tank cleaning operation events, which are connected by 
―OR‖ gate with each other.  
A.1 Tank Cleaning Operation 
Ships’ cargo tanks are needed to be cleaned after discharging any kind of chemical 
cargo before loading the subsequent cargo. Each tank cleaning procedures differ 
from others, depending on the chemical’s characteristics. Efficient tank cleaning is 
vital action to ensure that the subsequent cargo will remain in cargo tanks without 
any contamination during voyage and discharging. Other purpose of an efficient 
cleaning is to ensure the safety of ship and crew.  
The best way to be sure of convenience of tank cleaning operation, tank cleaning 
guide should be used as a primary guide. Tank cleaning guide offers procedures for 
each cargo transition by stating density of wash water, necessary cleaning media, 
time of washing, number of steaming and time of rinsing.  
In case of any improper cleaning and inoperative tank cleaning operation, this may 
cause cargo contamination.  
In this study, we divided tank cleaning operation faults into operational and technical 
faults. 
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A.1.1 Technical 
A.1.1.1 Improper ship design 
Though all clauses are made properly, in some cases due to technical faults, tank 
may not be cleaned well. Another important technical fault is improper ship design. 
Improper ship design fault is classified as incorrect cleaning gun position and 
recessed tank structure faults.  
i. Incorrect cleaning machine position 
Cargo tanks have generally two separated tank cleaning machines located diagonally. 
Though the machines are placed after making some optimizations, in rare cases 
positions of machines may lead an improper cleaning operation. In that respect 
inconvenient position of cleaning machine cause improper cleaning which may lead 
cargo off spec.  
ii. Recessed tank structure 
Bottom transverses, girders, stringers or similar structural members constitute 
recessed tank structure. On the tank’s bottom and sides, these structural members 
may impede the cleaning water to reach all surface of tank structure. That means the 
structural members may cause existing some blind sectors in the tank where the 
cleaning water can not reach properly. For that reason such kind of situation may 
lead improper tank cleaning operation and cargo contamination.  
IMO published a resolution to confine the percentage of both vertical and horizontal 
recessed tank structure.  
For horizontal areas of a tank bottom and the upper surfaces of a tank’s stringers and 
other large primary structural members, the total area shielded from direct 
impingement by deck or bottom transverses, main girders, stringers or similar large 
primary structural members shall not exceed 10 per cent of the total horizontal area 
of tank bottom, the upper surface of stringers, and other large primary structural 
members (IBC Code, 2007, p. 98). 
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―For vertical areas of the sides of a tank, the total area of the tank’s sides shielded 
from direct impingement by deck or bottom transverses, main girders, stringers or 
similar large primary structural members shall not exceed 15 per cent of the total 
area of the tank’s sides‖ (IBC Code, 2007, p. 114). 
A.1.1.2 Insufficient cleaning equipment 
Tank cleaning operation is foremost precaution to prevent cargo contamination. Not 
only structural rehabilitations are sufficient for a proper tank cleaning operation, but 
also cleaning equipment are to be in good condition. Any probable hitch on any 
cleaning equipment may cause improper cleaning which may lead cargo 
contamination.  
i. Insufficient cleaning machine 
Though the performance of cleaning machine suits the minimum requirements, by 
depending on some other factors, in some cases the machine may be insufficient to 
wash whole tank completely. For that respect performance of a cleaning machine 
needs to be increased for obtaining a fully cleaned cargo tank. According to 
MARPOL 73/78 (1978) ―the performance characteristic of a tank cleaning machine 
is governed by nozzle diameter, working pressure and the movement pattern and 
timing‖ (MARPOL 73/78, 1978, p.187). Figure 3.4 indicate performance 
characteristics of a cleaning machine.  
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Figure 3.4 : Movement patterns of cleaning machines (Url-2). 
ii. Insufficient hot water source 
Temperature of wash water is unchallengeable term for tank cleaning operations. As 
we mentioned before, any kind of violation on temperature of wash water directly 
causes cargo tanks remain dirty. Each type of cargoes carried by chemical tankers are 
absorbed by cargo tank coating more or less.  
Especially hydrocarbons are absorbed by the coating, which may contaminate the 
subsequent cargo. As the hot water is a good solvent, the only way to prevent such 
kind of contamination is hot water washing as per tank cleaning guide, wash water 
temperature clause. Making a tank cleaning with cooler water than the suggested by 
the guide, means not properly cleaned tank coating which cause cargo contamination. 
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iii. Insufficient water pressure 
Pressurized wash water has positive impact on removing the residue of previous 
cargo from tank coating.  
Each type of cleaning machines have different water pressure need but, commonly 
the tankers can product 6-9 bars pressurized wash water which is adequate for tank 
cleaning. Any decline of pressure affects the quality of cleaning directly which may 
be a result of any deficiency on the source or starting more cleaning machine than the 
source can supply. Moreover, reduced water pressure may not be able to rotate the 
main shaft of the machine, which means a water flow without any scanning of the 
tank. Thus, determined working pressure range of the machine should not be violated 
for preventing of any probable cargo contamination.             
A.1.2 Operational 
Operational event symbolizes the operational deficiencies during the tank cleaning 
operations. Figure 3.5 indicates the tree of operational fault. 
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Figure 3.5 : Fault tree of operational event. 
A.1.2.1 Dirty ullaging, sounding & sampling devices 
A proper tank, line and hose cleaning is not sufficient precaution to prevent cargo 
contamination. Practically, one of the most probable overlooked processes is the 
proper cleaning of sampling and sounding devices. Regardless of whether tank is 
clean, a dirty sampling and sounding device may contaminate the cargo. Probable 
residue of previous cargo in somewhere of sampling and sounding device, in case of 
dipping into the cargo for measurements, pass through the cargo and contaminate the 
actual cargo. Though the amount of residue is minimal comparing with the cargo 
inside the tank, this small amount of residue could be enough to contaminate the 
cargo, as almost the whole chemicals have high purity and sensitivity.    
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A.1.2.2 Residues of previous content in tank, line, pump & hose 
Cargo tanks, line and hoses have meandering structure, which could cause remaining 
of any residues of previous cargo, cleaning agents, and salty wash water, which 
constitute the previous content.   
i. Previous cargo residue 
It is meant the cargo laden before the actual cargo, whose residue could influence 
purity of subsequent cargoes. In cranny parts of tanks and line not only liquid residue 
of previous cargo may remain, but also vapour of previous cargo may remain which 
may cause an odour contamination. In this study, we mentioned previous cargo 
residue as probable contaminant, which could remain in cargo tanks, lines and pumps 
after all cleaning and ventilation operations. 
Violation of tank cleaning guide; tank cleaning guide is an advisory source, which is 
prepared for all types of chemical cargoes transported by ships. Each type of cargoes 
is listed in the guide with their united nation numbers (UN). UN numbers are 
clustered according to their cleaning procedure similarities. The tank cleaning guide 
presents common cleaning procedures by consideration of the subjects as, resistance 
of cargoes to washing, sensitivity and reaction to cleaning media during the washing 
process and cleaning period of cleaning media. The guide informs the users the 
temperature of wash water, types of media, number of cleaning cycles and number of 
steaming cycle.   
Violation of steaming clause; after the washing process, the purpose of steaming is 
provision of getting rid of the sea salt placed inside the tank, which is previously 
washed by seawater. Secondly, it provides to dissolve all types of residues remained 
on tank sides and outlying places. In case of violation of steaming clause, it is 
probable to find especially oily residues of previous cargo and invisible seawater salt. 
For that respect, violation of steaming clause may cause cargo contamination. 
Violation of temperature of wash water; another factor as significant as steaming in 
the tank cleaning process is the temperature of wash water. Violation of temperature 
of wash water includes not only being under intended temperature but also being 
above it has to be.  
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For instance, after discharging caustic soda, which is intensely, carried by chemical 
tankers, if the washing process is conducted above the temperature of hot water it has 
to be, caustic soda turns into white residues, which cause to stick to the tank sides.  
These residue also cause the contamination for further loading operations. Due to 
these critical reasons, adjustment of seawater on exactly to the intended temperature 
is crucial.    
Violation of cleaning media clause; tank cleaning guide recommends particular 
cleaning media for particular cargoes. According to structure of chemicals, cleaning 
media is selected by consideration of being a solvent to this chemical causing no 
unwanted reactions. Therefore, in case of violation of media, in other words use of 
different media or not use media; it is not possible to say that the tanks are fully 
cleaned. For example, it is required to use alkali media while cleaning the animal oil 
based cargoes, similarly, solventborne media must be used to clean the vegetable oil 
based cargoes.   
 Type of Cleaning Media 
 Amount of Cleaning Media 
Violation of cycle clause; one cycle means that the nozzle of a cleaning machine 
starts spreying from set beginning angle and reaches to same point by scanning the 
whole tank. Tank cleaning clause defines the number of angle by assuming the rest is 
conducted in a proper manner. Therefore, implementation of all clauses of tank 
cleaning guide provides a fully cleaned cargo result. Moreover, these clauses cannot 
back up the the other one. For instance, washing by cold water rather than hotter by 
cleaning with more cycles rather cleaning guide recommends, does not mean a 
proper cleaning.    
ii. Cleaning residue 
During the improper wash operation, at the tank, pump and lines not only from the 
previous cargoes. There might be some residues of the cleaning media, seawater, 
fresh water and inert gas, which are used during cleaning operation.  
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Sea water residue; seawater, which is usually preferred for tank cleaning purpose, 
contains some components, shown in Figure 3.6, that cause cargo contamination in 
case of any contact.    
 
Figure 3.6 : Seawater components (Künzel, 1989). 
In the tanker industry for instance, methyl alcohol (CH3OH) which is one of the most 
sensitive cargoes requires a very clean tank and if there exists seawater, methyl 
alcohol will contaminate. Chlorine (Cl
-1
) inside the seawater displaces with hydroxyl 
group (OH
-1
) which has a weak bond and this results existing of methyl chloride 
(CH3Cl). It means chemical structure of this cargo is completely changed. 
 Insufficient steaming; the first way to get rid of the seawater salt inside the tank, 
pump and line is steaming. As a result of weak cleaning of sea water salt may 
contaminate the chemical characteristics of the further cargo.   
Insufficient flushing; second way to get rid of the sea water salt is flushing by fresh 
water, however this method is not enough itself. If flushing operation contributes 
steaming operation, it provides positive results.    
Fresh water residue; after processing the flushing and steaming operation, if fresh 
water still exist iside the tank or lines, especially fresh water even it is a minimal 
level, it contaminates the cargo.  
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For instance, before loading of sulphuric acid (H2SO4), if fresh water exists inside the 
tank and lines, H2SO4 reacts with water (H2O) and causes a flameless combustion. 
As a result of this reaction, excessive heat occurs. This case causes not only 
contamination of cargo but also even the ship may sink. 
Inert gas residue; before the tank cleaning operation, depending on the being 
discharged cargo, probable explosive gas should be removed from the tank 
atmosphere. As it is mentioned in International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and 
Terminals (ISGOTT), lower flammable limit (LFL) inside the tank should be 
reduced to %10 and lower (p.179). Even though this may be possible purging the 
tank by athmosphere gas, based on the safety lowering the lewer explosive limit 
(LEL) by inerting is more convenient and safer. Figure 3.7 indicates the purge 
process of tank athmosphere by inert gas and athmosphere gas. As shown in the 
figure, purging with athmosphere gas composes an inflammable mixture, which is 
not a preferred case. 
As a result, before cleaning, after tank inert process, if the tank is not purged from 
inert gas, it may contaminate the edible cargoes, which are sensitive to inert gas.  
 
 
Figure 3.7 : Gas concentrations in tank related with ventilation method 
(ISGOTT,2006). 
Tank cleaning media residue; cleaning media residue may remain in the tank and line 
like others in case of improper tank cleaning operation. It is possible to classify the 
reasons of this issue as operational and cleaning media decision.  
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Operational; in this study violation of temperature of wash water, violation of cycle 
clause and violation of steaming clause, mentioned before, are implied as reasons of 
operational faults.   
 violation of temperature of wash water 
 violation of cycle clause 
 violation of steaming clause 
Cleaning media decision, tank cleaning guide is prepared by taking into 
consideration the elimination of correct cleaning media residue in the end of correct 
cleaning operation. Therefore cleaning media decision is connected with operational 
fault by AND gate.   
Cleaning media decision fault means not only decision of cleaning media type but 
also amount of cleaning media.  
 Type of Cleaning Media 
 Amount of Cleaning Media 
A.2 Cargo handling equipment maintenance 
Lifespan of a merchant ship may reach to 20-40 years. It is obvious that total lifetime 
management of a ship is as important as the initial price when considering the 
maintenance cost and importance. Many studies on optimization of maintenance 
process in literature is an indication of how important the effective maintenance on 
board is. In case of an improper maintenance operation, the operation needs to be 
made again, which means additional time and equipment, which cause increment of 
management cost. Moreover, as a result of an improper cargo handling equipment 
maintenance, any defect causes probable delaying of cargo transportation, more 
labour  for fixing the problem bring more cost.  
For that respect shipowners pressure the on board and ashore workers for paying 
importance to maintenance and the shipbuilders for delivering products designed 
with long term operational and maintenance efficiency.  
Inferior spare part, improper execution of maintenance and violation of maintenance 
period are main subjects affecting the result and durability of maintenance.  
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In this study, root causes of cargo handling equipment maintenance fault are 
classified as technical and operational. Figure 3.8 indicates the tree of cargo handling 
equipment maintenance event.      
 
Figure 3.8 : Fault tree of cargo handling equipment maintenance event.  
A.2.1 Technical 
Technical cause of the cargo handling equipment maintenance fault is using of 
inferior spare parts. In case of inferior spare part usage, unexpected defect may 
occur, which may cause cargo contamination. In this study, improper ordering and 
improper quality and material assessment faults are thought as root cause of technical 
faults.  
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A.2.1.1 Improper ordering 
Proper maintenance operation could be performed so as far the correct and sufficient 
spare parts are used. Otherwise, the maintenance operation is not satisfactory, as the 
improper spare part could cause serious defects on equipment with time.  
The first step of having correct and proper spare part is the correct ordering from 
ships. There are some international catalogues, which comprise almost all spare part, 
with internationally accepted order numbers, which could be needed on board. IMPA 
and ISSA catalogues are the most commonly used catalogues on board. All 
descriptions of spare part ordering should be clear and comprehensible, even if there 
is no available sample in catalogues and still ordering number. 
A.2.1.2 Improper quality and material assessment 
Proper ordering from ships are not sufficient for obtaining correct and high quality 
spare parts, as the company’s purchasing department assess the orders in terms of 
some criterias as; cost, transportation, time and quality.  
In case of any improper material assessment, which could be originated from 
different reasons may cause purchasing of incorrect and poor quality spare parts that 
will cause improper maintenance operation. Figure 3.9 indicates a broken cargo 
pump shaft’s rusted and shivered ball bearings, which are not suitable for wet ship 
athmosphere. 
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Figure 3.9 : Shivered cargo pump shaft’s ball bearings (M/T Defne-S, 2010).  
A.2.2 Operational 
Supplying of good qualified spare part is not sufficient for proper cargo handling 
equipment maintenance. Execution of maintenance operation is as important as 
technical criterions. In case of any incorrect implication of spare part will cause 
defects on equipment, which may cause cargo contamination. Figure 3.10 indicates 
an unseated valve disc to valve seat because of improper application. This situation 
caused cargo contamination, as the valve leaks.  
 
Figure 3.10 : Unseated valve disc (M/T Defne-S, 2010). 
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A.2.2.1 Violation of planned maintenance 
Manufacturers or classification societies generate planned maintenance by taking 
into account the average breakdown time of the equipment. Incase of any delay on 
planned maintenance may cause defects on cargo handling equipment, which leads 
cargo contamination. Violation of planned maintenance is caused by violation of 
PMS or violation of planned maintenance.  
i. Violation of PMS 
PMS is a paper or software based system, which enables the operators to track 
maintenance operation in intervals, which are assigned by manufacturer or 
classification society. Planned maintenance system presents seafarers eighter 
schedules of maintenance operations or flowcharts, which describe how to operate 
the maintenance operation properly. PMS aims to minimize the human error on 
maintenance by presenting schedules and descriptive clowcharts. Incase of any PMS 
violation, overdue maintenance will exist, which may cause some defects on 
equipment that may lead cargo contamination.  
In this study, violation of PMS is classified as, being unfamiliar to company and ISM 
of seafarers and insufficient company follow up of PMS. 
 Being unfamiliar to company ISM 
 Insufficient company follw up 
ii. Lack of comprehensive PMS  
The seafarers on board can carry out the maintenance operations if and only there is a 
properly working PMS, as there are many diverse equipment and maintenance 
intervals. Moreover, each type of equipment has characteristic specifications, which 
involves particular maintenance process.  
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Some fundamental requirements could be listed as; 
 Inventory list included in the maintenance program. 
 Maintenance intervals. 
 Maintenance instructions to be followed. 
 Maintenance documentation and history. 
 Reference documents.  
 Document flow chart, which shows flow and filling of maintenance 
documents as planning cards, job cards etc. 
If a PMS is not fully comprehensive, some missing jobs will exist, as it is impossible 
for seafarers to know the whole jobs’ intervals and instructions.  
Having non-comprehensive PMS is caused by company’s negligence, non-functional 
system, limited system, and inadequate feedback from ship to company fault.  
Company’s negligence; lack of comprehensive PMS may be caused by some 
company related faults, originated from some causes as; heavy workload in office, 
having no related department and having no designated responsible officer. 
 Heavy work load in office 
 Having no related department 
 Having no designated responsible officer 
Non-functional system; one of the foremost reasons of not keeping up to date the 
PMS is unuserfriendly system interface. For that respect, the system should be as 
userfriendly as possible. In this study, non-functional system means awkward and 
unuseful system faults.  
Limited system; for every PMS, it is so ordinary having some missing equipment 
maintenance. For that respect, the system should be appropriate for adding new tasks 
and equipment maintenance processes.  
In this study, non-functional system means the system does not allow the operator to 
add new task and process for new equipment or incorrect equipment. 
Inadequate feedback from ship; feedback about any malfunction about the system 
from ship to company is the main process for providing convenient system.  
42 
As the unique competent of making some changes on important function of the 
system is company, the ship can not make necessary corrections on its own. In this 
stage the required feedback from ship to company has crucial importance.  
Lack of skill & knowledge; though all the other circumstances are carried out well, 
planned maintenance process may not be effective depending on seafarer factor. 
Incase of insufficient seamanship training or lack of experience on maintenance 
operation, maintenance process may not be carried out properly, which may cause 
cargo contamination in the end. In this study, lack of skill & knowledge is classified 
as; insufficient seamanship training and lack of experience.  
 Insufficient seamanship training 
 Lack of experience 
B Structural 
Some cases show that, some structure related faults may cause cargo contamination. 
In this study tructural faults are classified as; inconsistency of fitness certificate, tank 
coating faults and leakage.  
B.1 Inconsistency of fitness certificate 
It is an international certificate for carriage of dangerous chemicals in bulk, which 
states names of chemicals allowed for carriage on board. According to IBC Code 
(2007) ―the certificate is issued by classification society on behalf of Administration 
for a period which shall not exceed 5 years‖ (p.143). To assign a ship for carriage of 
dangerous chemicals, classification society makes survey on the structure, 
equipment, fittings, arrangements and materials of chemical tanker.  
IBC code listed some criterions that are to be taken into consideration for 
determining the type of coating as; 
 Notch ductility at the operating temperature;  
 Corrosive effect of the cargo; and  
 Possibility of hazardous reactions between the cargo and the material of 
construction.  
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Though a ship have appropriate fitness certificate for carriage of a chemical, 
practically the ship could not be capable of carriage due to some reasons like, 
inconvenient certification, early deterioration of equipment or tank coating. 
According to IBC Code (2007) the cargo shall be compatible with all materials of 
construction such that (p.134): 
 No damage to the integrity of the materials of construction is incurred.  
 No hazardous or potentially hazardous reaction is created.  
Some name of cargoes listed in fitness certificate and carried on board could differ 
from each other, which can be assumed as having same specifications by referring 
some legal documents. That implementation could lead a cargo off spec situation, as 
the specification of cargoes could not fully match up with the each one.   
B.2 Tank Coating 
Cargo tanks of a chemical tanker could be coated with various type of coating 
materials like epoxy, zinc and stainless steel. Each type of coating materials is more 
favourable for specific types of cargo. For example, stainless steel tanks especially 
required for aggressive acid chemicals, as sulphuric acid while epoxy coated tanks 
are more favourable for weak acids, gas oil, lub oils, jet fuels, alkalies, seawater, 
wine, vegetable oils, crude oils. According to IMO Resolution A.798(19), Selection 
of coating should be made taking into account the criterion stated below (p. 12).  
 Location of tank relative to heated surfaces  
 Frequency of ballasting/de-ballasting operations 
 Required surface condition  
 Required surface cleanliness and dryness 
 Supplementary cathodic protection 
In this study, as a reason of probable cargo off spec, we divided the Tank Coating 
into pushing limits of coating, insufficient maintenance and improper coating 
operation.  
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B.2.1 Pushing Limits of Coating  
One of the most important operational process is to check the ship’s Procedures and 
Arrangements (P&A) manual and Paint Manufacturers Coating Resistance list to 
understand the limits of coating. In case of any excessive operation to tank coating 
could deteriorate the structure of coating. Because of such kind of deterioration, ship 
may face to cargo off spec situation.  
B.2.2 Insufficient & Improper Maintenance 
Cargo tank coatings need some maintenance and touch up operations, as there could 
be occurrence of rust and pitting with time. If it is not prevented in time, these needs 
could become cargo contaminant effect on some exact cargoes like caustic soda. 
Caustic soda is corrosive, colourless liquid which is very susceptible to rust.  
In case of any exposure to rust, colour of the caustic soda turns into the rubiginous, 
which means of cargo contamination.  
According to MSC.1/Circular.1399, there are some criterions to define the condition 
of coating as ―GOOD‖, ―FAIR‖, ―POOR‖.  
Table 3.3 : Coating condition table (MSC.1/Circular.1399).  
 GOOD
(3)
 FAIR POOR 
Breakdown of coating  
(spot breakdown) 
(1) (3)
 
< 5% 5 – 20% > 20% 
Area of complete breakdown 
(1)
 — < 10% ≥ 10% 
Local breakdown of coating on 
edges or weld lines 
(2)
 
< 20% 20 – 50% > 50% 
 
1 indicates the percentage calculated on basis of the area under consideration or of 
the "critical structural area". 
2 indicates the percentage calculated on basis of edges or weld lines in the area under 
consideration or of the "critical structural area". 
3 indicates spot breakdown, i.e. rusting in spots without visible failure of coating. 
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Additionally there are some key considerations to pay attention during coating 
maintenance process as MSC.1/Circular.1399 (2011) mentioned (p. 8); 
 Safety, including tank entry requirements 
 Tank surface cleaning 
 Salt contamination 
 Rust scale 
 Pitting corrosion 
 Temperature 
 Condensation 
 Ventilation 
 Compatibility of coating systems 
B.2.3 Improper coating operation 
Tank coating is the primary interface between miscellaneous type of cargoes and 
ship’s structure. Therefore, coating should be durable against the every effect of 
cargoes. Strength of tank coating mostly depends on coating operation at the 
beginning. There are many factors that could influence the lifetime and strength of a 
coating, which should be taken into consideration during the coating operation. Main 
factors, which should be taken into consideration, could be sequenced as; 
 Surface cleaning 
 Rust scale 
 Temperature 
 Condensation 
 Humidity 
 Ventilation  
 Heating/Drying 
B.3 Leakage 
Cargo tank should be leak-proof in every respect, as diverse chemical cargoes could 
be susceptible to any environmental factors such as fresh air, sea water, sun light 
other cargoes’ vapour etc. For that respect, there should not be any tank inlet out of 
control and knowledge, like cracks on lines and tank, leaking valves etc.  
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We mentioned leakage not only as a tank inlet, but also any leakage from heating 
coils, which is not under control and noticeable that could affect the cargo purity by 
letting any contaminant to pass through it to the cargo tank.  
3.2.1.2 Monitoring fault 
There could be always some defected equipment on a system. The important thing is 
notice this defects in time, which is possible with proper and correct monitoring.ın 
this study, monitoring faults are searched as fault that cause cargo contamination 
because of not detecting any kind of defects before any accident. 
Monitoring faults are classified as technical and operational faults, which are lined 
by ―OR‖ gate to each other. Figure 3.11 indicates the tree of monitoring fault. 
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Figure 3.11 : Fault tree of monitoring event. 
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A Operational 
Operational faults are commonly originated from instant faults made by human 
beings. For instance, a chief officer of a chemical tanker should check the cargo 
handling equipment during cargo operations with the intention of detecting any 
probable defect not to cause any cargo contamination. Procedural or human and 
system interaction faults cause operational faults. 
A.1 Procedural 
Procedural faults are usually originated from either insufficient fault or violation of 
procedures fault. In case of having insufficient procedure or violation of existing 
procedures may cause cargo contamination during cargo opertions. Because loading, 
unloading or tank cleaning operations are critical operations, as the ship may get in 
trouble with any equipment, though its all other procedural requirements are 
performed.  
 Insufficient procedures 
 Violation of procedures  
A.2 Human & system interaction  
Though developing technology brings out some new facilities, there are some 
disadvantages caused by technology. One of these disadvantages is human and 
system interaction problem.  
There are some systems consisted of sensors, computer and related software. Thus 
the officers can follow some important changeable values during cargo operations. 
This system enable officers to notice any unwanted situation relevant to tank and line 
pressure, tank level, cargo valve’s positions, pump pressures etc. For instance, in 
case of any improper usage of the system due to user related reasons, the officer 
would not be able to notice any unclosed valve which may cause cargo 
contamination.  
 
 
48 
Human and system interaction problem is caused by lack of knowledge, insufficient 
training, and incorrect operation faults. 
 Lack of knowledge 
 Insufficient training 
 Incorrect operation 
B Technical 
Monitoring process may not be done properly because of technical reasons. In this 
study technical faults are classified as inadequate indication, incorrect indication and 
unactivated alarms faults.  
B.1 Inadequate indication 
In some cases it is observed that the monitoring systems are inadequate for indication 
of all required and anticipated information, which may cause an unwarranted 
confidence on officers as the system does not indicate any abnormal situation.  
Inadequate indication can be classified as non-comprehensive monitoring system, 
insufficient number of screen, unsuitable position of screens. 
 Non-comprehensive monitoring system 
 Insufficient number of screen 
 Unsuitable position of screens 
B.2 Incorrect indication 
Incorrect indication is caused by monitoring system mistakes, which may cargo 
contamination, as the value indicated on the screen is different from the real one. 
Monitoring system mistake is caused by non-overlapping system with real or 
inaccurate sensor faults. In some cases, the diagram on the system could be different 
from the real. In this situation, for instance when the officers intend to open a valve, 
they are misleaded as the diagram indicates incorrectly, which may cause cargo 
contamination. Furthermore, as inaccurate sensors cause incorrect indication, the 
officers are misleaded and in case of any critical situation that is needed to be 
interfered, officers can not notice the situation that may leads cargo contamination.   
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4.  CASE STUDY 
Cargo contamination fault tree will be searched as case study. As it is mentioned in 
the methedology section, as we have no BE with known probability, we skip the 
separating hazards and calculating of hazards with failure rate stages. 
As it is mentioned before, experts’ cosultation is made before the study. Related 
document’s template is indicated in appendices section of this study.  
4.1 Rating stage 
As mentioned before, linguistic expressions will be transformed into fuzzy numbers 
using appropriate numerical approximation method developed by Chen and Hwang 
(Chen and Hwang, 1992, p.6) Standardized seven level linguistic scales shown in 
Table 4.1 {Very Low (VL), Low (L), Mildly Low (ML), Medium (M), Mildly High 
(MH), High (H), Very High (HV)} are used for transforming linguistic expressions 
to fuzzy numbers.  
Typical estimation of human brain is seven plus-minus chunks that means according 
to Miller, number of linguistic terms are needed to be determined between 5-9 for 
making proper estimation (Miller, 1956). For that respect, 7 level fuzzy linguistic 
scale is selected, shown in Figure 4.1. All fuzzy numbers are needed to be converted 
into trapezoidal fuzzy number for appliying the method. 
Table 4.1 : Fuzzy number sets of the scale. 
Linguistic terms Fuzzy sets 
Very Low (VL) (0,0,0.1,0.2) 
Low (L) (0.1,0.2,0.2,0.3) 
Mildly Low (ML) (0.2,0.3,0.4,0.5) 
Medium (M) (0.4,0.5,0.5,0.6) 
Mildly High (MH) (0.5,0.6,0.7,0.8) 
High (H) (0.7,0.8,0.8,0.9) 
Very High (HV) (0.8,0.9,1,1) 
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Figure 4.1 : Fuzzy numbers representing linguistic values. 
Ten experts are consulted for this study. As mentioned before, heterogeneous expert 
group is used for judgements. Therefore, each expert has different weights as shown 
in Table 4.2. 
Table 4.2 : Expert weights. 
No of 
experts 
Professional 
position 
Sea service 
time (year) 
Shore service 
time (year) 
Educational 
level 
Weighting 
factor 
w 
1 Academician 3-5 11-15 PhD 15 
0,1
3 
2 Academician 3-5 ≤ 5 MSc 12 
0,1
1 
3 Chief officer ≤ 2 ≤ 5 bachelor 6 
0,0
5 
4 Chief officer ≤ 2 ≤ 5 bachelor 6 
0,0
5 
5 
Operations 
manager 
11-15 11-15 MSc 15 
0,1
3 
6 
Operations 
manager 
≥ 16 16-25 PhD 18 
0,1
6 
7 Deck inspector 6-10 ≤ 5 MSc 11 
0,1
0 
8 Master 6-10 ≤ 5 bachelor 9 
0,0
8 
9 Academician 3-5 6-10 PhD 14 
0,1
2 
10 Master 3-5 ≤ 5 bachelor 8 
0,0
7 
4.2 Aggregation stage 
In this stage, choices of all experts are aggregated with the formulas given before. 
For obtaining consensus coefficient, the necessary value of   is determined as 0.5 
for all experts. Aggregation process of BE X59 is shown in Table 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, 4.6, 
4.7 as an example. 
 
0
0,2
0,4
0,6
0,8
1
0 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,9 1
Possibility, p 
M
em
b
er
sh
ip
 f
u
n
ct
io
n
 
51 
Table 4.3 : 
1 2 3 4R (r , r , r , r )u u u u u  experts’ opinions for BE X59. 
Experts 
Opinions of experts 
1ru  2ru  3ru  4ru  
E1 0,1 0,2 0,2 0,3 
E2 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 
E3 0,4 0,5 0,5 0,6 
E4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 
E5 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 
E6 0,1 0,2 0,2 0,3 
E7 0,1 0,2 0,2 0,3 
E8 0,4 0,5 0,5 0,6 
E9 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 
E10 0,4 0,5 0,5 0,6 
 
Table 4.4 : Similarity functions. 
No 
Similarity 
function 
Similarity 
function 
value 
No 
Similarity 
function 
Similarity 
function 
value 
No 
Similarity 
function 
Similarity 
function 
value 
1 S(E1&E2) 0,85 16 S(E2&E9) 1 31 S(E5&E6) 0,85 
2 S(E1&E3) 0,7 17 S(E2&E10) 0,85 32 S(E5&E7) 0,85 
3 S(E1&E4) 0,55 18 S(E3&E4) 0,85 33 S(E5&E8) 0,85 
4 S(E1&E5) 0,85 19 S(E3&E5) 0,85 34 S(E5&E9) 1 
5 S(E1&E6) 1 20 S(E3&E6) 0,7 35 S(E5&E10) 0,85 
6 S(E1&E7) 1 21 S(E3&E7) 0,7 36 S(E6&E7) 0,7 
7 S(E1&E8) 0,7 22 S(E3&E8) 1 37 S(E6&E8) 0,7 
8 S(E1&E9) 0,85 23 S(E3&E9) 0,85 38 S(E6&E9) 0,85 
9 S(E1&E10) 0,7 24 S(E3&E10) 1 39 S(E6&E10) 0,7 
10 S(E2&E3) 0,85 25 S(E4&E5) 0,7 40 S(E7&E8) 0,7 
11 S(E2&E4) 0,7 26 S(E4&E6) 0,55 41 S(E7&E9) 0,85 
12 S(E2&E5) 1 27 S(E4&E7) 0,55 42 S(E7&E10) 0,7 
13 S(E2&E6) 0,85 28 S(E4&E8) 0,85 43 S(E8&E9) 0,85 
14 S(E2&E7) 0,85 29 S(E4&E9) 0,7 44 S(E8&E10) 1 
15 S(E2&E8) 0,85 30 S(E4&E10) 0,85 45 S(E9&E10) 0,85 
 
Table 4.5 : Average and relative aggrement values of experts. 
Average agreement of experts (AA) Relative agreement of experts (RA) 
E1 0,8 E1 0,10 
E2 0,866 E2 0,11 
E3 0,833 E3 0,10 
E4 0,7 E4 0,09 
E5 0,866 E5 0,11 
E6 0,766 E6 0,09 
E7 0,766 E7 0,09 
E8 0,833 E8 0,10 
E9 0,866 E9 0,11 
E10 0,833 E10 0,10 
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Table 4.6 : Consensus coefficient (CC). 
Consensus coefficient (CC) 
CC1 0,1149 
CC2 0,1059 
CC3 0,0775 
CC4 0,0693 
CC5 0,1190 
CC6 0,1260 
CC7 0,0953 
CC8 0,0907 
CC9 0,1146 
CC10 0,0863 
 
Table 4.7 : Aggregation of BE X59. 
Aggregation of BE X59 
0,2381 0,3381 0,3790 0,4790 
4.3 Defuzzification of subjective BEs 
As mentioned before, center of area defuzzification method is applied in this study. 
Table 4.8 indicates defuzzification results of all BEs. 
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Table 4.8 : Defuzzification results of all BEs. 
BEs Defuzzification of BEs (CFP) BEs Defuzzification of BEs (CFP) 
X01 0,133 X31 0,320 
X02 0,178 X32 0,253 
X03 0,342 X33 0,191 
X04 0,415 X34 0,215 
X05 0,417 X35 0,284 
X06 0,480 X36 0,377 
X07 0,423 X37 0,400 
X08 0,543 X38 0,358 
X09 0,407 X39 0,306 
X10 0,377 X40 0,453 
X11 0,506 X41 0,427 
X12 0,462 X42 0,489 
X13 0,358 X43 0,350 
X14 0,313 X44 0,299 
X15 0,368 X45 0,436 
X16 0,350 X46 0,384 
X17 0,192 X47 0,403 
X18 0,575 X48 0,293 
X19 0,506 X49 0,318 
X20 0,534 X50 0,236 
X21 0,395 X51 0,317 
X22 0,394 X52 0,417 
X23 0,240 X53 0,506 
X24 0,225 X54 0,460 
X25 0,205 X55 0,214 
X26 0,411 X56 0,345 
X27 0,371 X57 0,328 
X28 0,222 X58 0,373 
X29 0,330 X59 0,332 
X30 0,364   
4.4 Converting CFPs to failure probability 
Converting CFP into FP process is possible by applying Eq. 2.17 and 2.18. Table 4.9 
indicates the failure probability of all BEs.  
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Table 4.9 : Converting CFP into failure probability. 
BEs FP of BEs BEs FP of BEs BEs FP of BEs 
X01 5,047E-05 X21 0,00222 X41 0,0029 
X02 0,000147 X22 0,00221 X42 0,00461 
X03 0,00137 X23 0,000415 X43 0,00148 
X04 0,00263 X24 0,000335 X44 0,000875 
X05 0,00267 X25 0,000244 X45 0,00312 
X06 0,00434 X26 0,00255 X46 0,00202 
X07 0,00281 X27 0,0018 X47 0,00239 
X08 0,00671 X28 0,000321 X48 0,000821 
X09 0,00246 X29 0,00122 X49 0,00108 
X10 0,0019 X30 0,00169 X50 0,000392 
X11 0,00522 X31 0,0011 X51 0,00107 
X12 0,0038 X32 0,0005 X52 0,00267 
X13 0,0016 X33 0,000188 X53 0,00522 
X14 0,00102 X34 0,000287 X54 0,00373 
X15 0,00175 X35 0,00074 X55 0,00028 
X16 0,00149 X36 0,0019 X56 0,00141 
X17 0,000193 X37 0,00233 X57 0,00119 
X18 0,0083 X38 0,0016 X58 0,00184 
X19 0,00523 X39 0,00095 X59 0,00125 
X20 0,00632 X40 0,00354   
After obtaining the failure probabilities of all BEs, it is possible to calculate the 
failure probability of TE. As it is mentioned before, when the required formulas in 
equations between 3.1 – 3.7 are applied, depending on the logic gates, the failure 
probability of TE can be calculated.  
After the calculations, failure probability of TE is obtained as 0,000368. MCSs and 
list of F-VIM are shown in Table 4.10 and 4.11.    
4.5 Calculation failure probability of TE 
In this stage, generic FTA can be applied, as failure probability of all BEs are 
obtained and known. Eq. 2.19 is used for calculating probability of TE. Moreover, 
MCSs are listed in Table 4.10. 
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Table 4.10 : Occurance probabilities of MCSs. 
MCSs Probability MCSs Probability MCSs Probability MCSs Probability 
X06X53 2,265E-05 X45X59 3,900E-06 X16X57 1,773E-06 X17X54 7,199E-07 
X45X53 1,629E-05 X46X58 3,717E-06 X43X57 1,761E-06 X44X48 7,184E-07 
X06X54 1,619E-05 X45X57 3,713E-06 X06X50 1,701E-06 X32X56 7,050E-07 
X47X53 1,248E-05 X06X48 3,563E-06 X46X48 1,658E-06 X47X55 6,692E-07 
X45X54 1,164E-05 X47X56 3,370E-06 X44X58 1,610E-06 X32X59 6,250E-07 
X06X52 1,159E-05 X45X49 3,370E-06 X16X49 1,609E-06 X32X57 5,950E-07 
X46X53 1,054E-05 X45X51 3,338E-06 X43X49 1,598E-06 X16X50 5,841E-07 
X47X54 8,915E-06 X44X54 3,264E-06 X16X51 1,594E-06 X43X50 5,802E-07 
X45X52 8,330E-06 X47X59 2,988E-06 X43X51 1,584E-06 X46X55 5,656E-07 
X06X58 7,986E-06 X31X52 2,937E-06 X31X56 1,551E-06 X32X49 5,400E-07 
X16X53 7,778E-06 X46X56 2,848E-06 X31X59 1,375E-06 X32X51 5,350E-07 
X43X53 7,726E-06 X47X57 2,844E-06 X32X52 1,335E-06 X17X52 5,153E-07 
X46X54 7,535E-06 X16X58 2,742E-06 X31X57 1,309E-06 X31X50 4,312E-07 
X47X52 6,381E-06 X43X58 2,723E-06 X44X56 1,234E-06 X16X55 4,172E-07 
X06X56 6,119E-06 X32X53 2,610E-06 X16X48 1,223E-06 X43X55 4,144E-07 
X31X53 5,742E-06 X47X49 2,581E-06 X45X50 1,223E-06 X32X48 4,105E-07 
X45X58 5,741E-06 X45X48 2,562E-06 X6X55 1,215E-06 X17X58 3,551E-07 
X16X54 5,558E-06 X47X51 2,557E-06 X43X48 1,215E-06 X44X50 3,430E-07 
X43X54 5,520E-06 X46X59 2,525E-06 X31X49 1,188E-06 X31X55 3,080E-07 
X06X59 5,425E-06 X46X57 2,404E-06 X31X51 1,177E-06 X17X56 2,721E-07 
X46X52 5,393E-06 X44X52 2,336E-06 X44X59 1,094E-06 X44X55 2,450E-07 
X06X57 5,165E-06 X46X49 2,182E-06 X44X57 1,041E-06 X17X59 2,413E-07 
X06X49 4,687E-06 X46X51 2,161E-06 X17X53 1,007E-06 X17X57 2,297E-07 
X06X51 4,644E-06 X16X56 2,101E-06 X44X49 9,450E-07 X17X49 2,084E-07 
X44X53 4,568E-06 X43X56 2,087E-06 X47X50 9,369E-07 X17X51 2,065E-07 
X45X56 4,399E-06 X31X58 2,024E-06 X44X51 9,363E-07 X32X50 1,960E-07 
X47X58 4,398E-06 X47X48 1,962E-06 X32X58 9,200E-07 X17X48 1,585E-07 
X31X54 4,103E-06 X32X54 1,865E-06 X31X48 9,031E-07 X32X55 1,400E-07 
X16X52 3,978E-06 X16X59 1,863E-06 X45X55 8,736E-07 X17X50 7,566E-08 
X43X52 3,952E-06 X43X59 1,850E-06 X46X50 7,918E-07 X17X55 5,404E-08 
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Table 4.11 : Sensitive analysis of first 30 MCSs. 
TE=0,000368  
No of MCS Occurance probability of MCS F-VIM 
X06X53 2,265E-05 0,0616 
X45X53 1,629E-05 0,0443 
X06X54 1,619E-05 0,0440 
X47X53 1,248E-05 0,0339 
X45X54 1,164E-05 0,0316 
X06X52 1,159E-05 0,0315 
X46X53 1,054E-05 0,0287 
X47X54 8,915E-06 0,0242 
X45X52 8,330E-06 0,0226 
X06X58 7,986E-06 0,0217 
X16X53 7,778E-06 0,0211 
X43X53 7,726E-06 0,0210 
X46X54 7,535E-06 0,0205 
X47X52 6,381E-06 0,0173 
X06X56 6,119E-06 0,0166 
X31X53 5,742E-06 0,0156 
X45X58 5,741E-06 0,0156 
X16X54 5,558E-06 0,0151 
X43X54 5,520E-06 0,0150 
X06X59 5,425E-06 0,0147 
X46X52 5,393E-06 0,0147 
X06X57 5,165E-06 0,0140 
X06X49 4,687E-06 0,0127 
X06X51 4,644E-06 0,0126 
X44X53 4,568E-06 0,0124 
X45X56 4,399E-06 0,0120 
X47X58 4,398E-06 0,0120 
X31X54 4,103E-06 0,0111 
X16X52 3,978E-06 0,0108 
X43X52 3,952E-06 0,0107 
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5.   RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
In this section, a cargo contamination case event will be studied. Moreover, change 
of TE’s probability and prevention cost will be studied when the most effective MCS 
of X06X53 failures are eliminated.  
Table 5.1 indicates the relevant informations about ship, the cargo laden, unit price 
of cargo and total price of cargo on board.  
Table 5.1 : Informations about ship and cargo. 
Ship’s cargo 
capacity (ton) 
Name of cargo 
Unit price of cargo 
(USD/ton) 
Total Price of cargo 
on board (USD) 
10.000 ton 
Acrylonitrile 
Butadiene 
Styrene 
3100 31.000.000 
As shown in Table 5.1 when the ship is loaded with Acrylonitrile Butadiene Styrene, 
total cost of the cargo on board is 31.000.000 USD. When we consider only cost of 
cargo, in case of such cargo contamination, very excessive costs occur. Furthermore, 
after every cargo contamination events, the vessel loses time for further investigation 
about the event. Both of losing time and further investigation process increase the 
cost originated from contamination. In some cases, till the judicial process is ended 
up; the contaminated cargo is kept in an entrepot shore tanks, which also increases 
the contamination cost. Besides when the ship of a company is remembered with any 
cargo contamination, the company may face with loss of reputation, which can not be 
measured with money. 
Usually this type of ship has number of 12 cargo tanks and cargo contamination 
occurs in one or two cargo tanks except for rare events. In this study, cargo 
contamination is taken into consideration as if it occurs in only two cargo tanks, 
which has totally 1.500 ton cargo capacity. We can calculate the value of cargo in 
this tank by multiplying the unit price of cargo with its weight. Result of this 
equation gives us the vale of 1.500 ton cargo, which costs 4.650.000 USD in the 
lights of informations given in Table 5.1.  
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As it is calculated before, failure probability of TE is obtained as 0,000368. When we 
consider a company that has 10 pieces of chemical tankers, which on  the average 
can be assumed each one makes any cargo operations including tank cleaning 
operations for 6 times in a month. From this point of view, the fleet makes 720 times 
cargo operations. Thus we can calculate the time period of probable cargo 
contamination for this fleet, as the failure probability of TE is known.  
368
1000000 720
G
  (5.1) 
―G‖ symbolizes occurance number of TE in a year. By using Eq. 5.1 value of G can 
be obtained as 0, 26496. 
1
0,26496
B
  (5.2) 
―B‖ symbolizes time period of TE occurance. By using Eq. 5.2 value of B can be 
calculated as 3,774 (T1) years. That means this model company may face with cargo 
contamination event in each 3,774 years. In other words the company will meet a 
loss of 4,65 million USD in every 3,774 years. 
When we consider that mathematically risk equals multiplication of frequency of any 
event occurance with consequence of this event, we can understand how much the 
cargo contamination has risk. If an event occurs with probability of 0,000368 and has 
a serious result as loss of 4,65 million USD in each occurance, cargo contamination 
event is needed to be perceived as very risky.   
In every system it is possible to reduce the risk by taking some precautions. The most 
effective way of reducing the risk of any failure occurance is to determine the root 
causes of the top event and eliminate the root causes as much as possible in terms of 
tehcnical and economical aspects. This study proposes the companies a novel 
solution way to reduce risk of cargo contamination event by serving all probable root 
causes and calculating the occurance probabilities of these root causes with fuzzy 
based fault tree analysis, which is not applied for this purpose before.  
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For the purpose of reducing the probability of cargo contamination event, the most 
effective MCS, X06X53, is eliminated and new probability of TE is calculated as 
0,000345 that means if these events can be eliminated, cargo contamination will 
occur in every 4,021 (T2) years. 
2 1 4,021 3,774 0,247T T     
(5.3) 
As shown in Eq. 5.3, with new TE probability, occurance of cargo contamination is 
delayed for 2,964 months. According to this calculation, monthly cost of cargo 
contamination event declines from 65.712 USD/month to 51.396 USD/month. That 
means 14.316 USD outgoing per month can be prevented by eliminating BEs X06 
and X53.  
As it is mentioned before BEs of X06 is dirty ullaging, sounding and sampling 
device fault and X53 is non-calibrated sensors fault. For eliminating occurance of 
these events, some equipment and additional labour are needed.    
Elimination way of dirty ullaging, sounding and sampling device fault is if and only 
spending more time to clean the devices properly. When we consider that the bosun 
needs 2 additional hours to clean these equipment properly. As we assumed before 
that each ship makes cargo operations for 6 times in a month, that means 12 
additional hours are required per month. If salary of a bosun is taken 3000 USD and 
bosun works 10 hours in an ordinary day on board, that means hour wage of a bosun 
is 100 USD. For 4,021 years, 48.252 USD additional labours are obtained for all 
fleet.  
For eliminating non-calibrated sensors fault, there is a need of proper working 
reference calibrator and additional chief officer labour. According to our findings, 
occurance probability of non-calibrated sensor failure is 0,00522. That means such 
fault will occur once in 95 days. By putting a safety margin, routine calibration 
period is determined as 75 days. We assumed calibrating of all cargo related sensors 
takes 1 working day of chief officer and day wage of chief officer is 265 USD where 
his salary is 8.000 USD. According to these calculations, 51.147 USD additional 
labours are required. Moreover, one of the best manucaturers’ calibrating sensor’s 
price is 1.500 USD. For all fleet 15.000 USD additional fund is required where the 
indutrial lifes of these equipment are for 5 years.  
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Totally, for eliminating non-calibrated sensors fault, there is a need of 114.000 USD 
additional funds where the benefit is 238.000 USD and net benefit is 124.000 USD 
for 4,021 years.  
Table 5.2 indicates the obtained benefits by eliminating the MCSs. 
Table 5.2 : Obtained benefits by eliminating MCSs.     
MCSs Occurance 
probability 
Probability of 
new TE 
Obtained benefit 
(USD) 
X06X53 2,265E-05 0,0003453 286.274 
X45X53 1,629E-05 0,0003517 205.800 
X06X54 1,619E-05 0,0003518 204.559 
X47X53 1,248E-05 0,0003555 157.648 
X45X54 1,164E-05 0,0003564 147.057 
X06X52 1,159E-05 0,0003564 146.427 
X46X53 1,054E-05 0,0003575 133.242 
X47X54 8,915E-06 0,0003591 112.649 
X45X52 8,330E-06 0,0003597 105.266 
X06X58 7,986E-06 0,0003600 100.909 
By making similar analysis for all MCSs, it is possible to determine profitable 
eliminations.  
In this study, as it is mentioned before, other factors increasing the contamination 
costs are omitted. When the other outgoings added the cost of cargo contamination, 
increment of total cost should not be overlooked. As it is seen, systematical approach 
to cargo contamination events has favorable effects on declining the risk of 
contamination.  
Consequently, if the relevant precautions are taken it is possible to reduce the 
probability of cargo contamination event from 0,000368 to less. The fisrt step of this 
process shoul be the analysis of cost for eliminating BEs. As the less effective MCS 
may cost much more than the more effective one, cost of all MCS analysis is needed 
to be done, which will be studied in our future researches. 
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6.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
By the changes within last decades in maritime industry, specialization in ship types 
get more important. Concordantly, the importance of chemical cargoes transportation 
via seas is growing with years. This transportation mode indisputibly brings many 
advantages. Nevertheless, huge amount of cargo transportation brings some 
disadvantages and risks existing before. Having greater risks of cargo transportation 
via seas than before is originated from the big amount of the handled cargo.  
One of the most prominent risks of cargo transportation by ships is cargo 
contamination event, which is suffered by either word wide transporting ships or 
bunker barges. In case of any cargo contamination event, as the prejudice is high, it 
constitudes high risky results. Though the results of such events can influence the 
financial condition very deeply, the necessary studies in terms of either academical 
or industrial are not executed yet. This is one of the most motivative factors that 
induced me to propose this study. There are several and vital precautions to prevent a 
cargo contamination in the industry, which are not adequate and produced as a result 
of systematical cause and effect anaylsis.   
For that respects, the industry is passionately looking for a systematic way which 
proposes root causes of cargo contamination briefly and produces a solution way to 
reduce the probability of contamination event. Such kind of needs are motivated us 
to make a novel study which produces all probable root causes of chemical cargo 
contamination event as brief as not previously. Furthermore the proposed approach 
which is named as fuzzy fault tree analysis (FFTA) is suitable to make an extensive 
cost-benefit analysis as it is possible to observe how much the probability of 
contamination event reduces, when any of root causes is eliminated.  
Fault tree analysis (FTA) is a systematic way to obtain reliability of complex systems 
both qualitatively and quantitatively. FTA serves estimation about failure probability 
of top event (TE) using generic data. In other words, it uses exact values to for 
estimation of TE failure probability.  
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Purpose of this study is not only calculating the failure probability of TE by fuzzy 
approach, but also proposing a source for cost-benefit analysis. In other words, the 
main purpose of this study is to identify an appropriate management tool to reduce 
the risk by reducing the probability of the contamination, where the fuzzy approach 
based FTA method is used to determine the existing probability of the contamination. 
In this research, a case study of eliminating one of the root causes of TE is carried 
out. Obtained benefits and costs of this process are also produced subsequently. 
The developed framework is aimed to assist identification of the critical minimum 
cut set (MCT)’s of a chemical tanker operation which may result with cargo 
contamination. From the results of all calculations follwing conclusions are drawn: 
- This generated model study can reveal the all root causes of chemical cargo 
contamination fault as the FTA method naturally provide a big opportunity for this 
purpose. The obtained root causes of the fault provide a comprehensive research 
opportunity on providing such accidents as the study provides a wide outlook of the 
root cause map. For example obtaining the root causes process of risk assesments for 
specific operations can be detailed by applying this study. 
- In results and discussions section a model company is addressed and related 
calculations are executed acoording to this company’s special conditions. The results 
indicate it is possible to make profit by applying this study. For that respect, this 
study can provide guidelines for companies to make a comprehensive cost-benefit 
analysis about cargo contamination faults.      
- Fuzzy approach for fault tree analysis could be a good alternative solution for 
dealing with the weak points of conventional FTA, which is insufficient in case of 
any lack of information. 
- Linguistic variables help to overcome vagueness of occurance expression, as the 
experts make estimation with fuzzy scale. Moreover, fuzzy scale enable us to 
describe the the hazards of each event more flexiblely.    
- The obtained importance measures will help to rank the all MCSs, by taking into 
consideration their importance. Thus the system users can determine which MCS is 
the most effective during the MCS eliminating stage.  
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As it is mentioned in case study, one of the most effective MCSs is selected for 
elimination and as a result of this application, though the other costs are omitted, the 
sample company profits 124.000 USD in 4 years. This case study indicates the 
effectiveness of the approaching method by taking into consideration the only one 
MCS. 
However, elimination of all MCSs and required cost for it and obtained profit in the 
result are not mentioned in this study. In the future research, we will study on all 
MCSs elimination process and obtained profit in the result operation.  Besides, in this 
study all BEs are assumed as independent. In other words, probable relations 
between the BEs are omitted. In the future researches, we will analysis the structure 
with diverse methodology, which can take into consideration the probable relations 
between the BEs. Though, this process may influence the probability values even 
few, we intend to employ such method for aiming to obtain more precise values and 
more accurate results for industry. 
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APPENDIX A: Expert estimation questionnaire. 
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APPENDIX A  
Fault Tree Analysis of Chemical Cargo Contaminations by 
Fuzzy Approach Questionnaire 
 
Name - Surname  
 
Please select the most suitable situations given below. 
 
Professional Position 
Academician   
Company Operations Manager   
Company Deck Inspector   
Master   
Chief Officer   
  
Sea Service Time 
≥16   
11 - 15   
6 - 10   
3 - 5   
≤ 3   
  
Shore Service Time 
≥26   
16 - 25   
11 - 15   
6 - 10   
≤ 5   
  Education Level 
PhD   
Master   
Bachelor   
HND   
School Level   
Figure A.1 : First page of questionnaire. 
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VL:Very Low L: Low ML: Mildly Low M: Medium 
MH: Mildly High H: High VH: Very High  
Figure A.2 : Second page of questionnaire. 
 
VL L ML M MH H VH
1 Incorrect cleaning machine position
2 Recessed tank structure
3 Insufficient cleaning machine
4 Insufficient hot water source
5 Insufficient water pressure
6 Dirty ullaging, sounding & sampling devices
7 Violation of steaming clause
8 Violation of temperature of wash water
9 Type of Cleaning Media
10 Amount of Cleaning Media
11 Violation of cycle clause
12 Insufficient ventilation
13 Insufficient information about cargo
14 Insufficient steaming
15 Insufficient flushing
16 Fresh water residue
17 Inert gas residue
18 violation of temperature of wash water
19 violation of cycle clause
20 violation of steaming clause
21 Type of Cleaning Media
22 Amount of Cleaning Media
23 Insufficient company evaluation system
24 Lack of company evaluation system
25 Insufficient procedures
26 Violation of procedures
27 Operational deficiencies
28 Non-operational ship design
29 Application of incorrect material
30 Incorrect application
31 Improper quality and material assesment
32 Improper ordering
33 Having no designated responsible officer
34 Having no related department
35 Heavy work load in office
36 Non-functional system
37 Limited system
38 Inadequate feedback from ship
39 Insufficient company follow up
40 Being unfamiliar to company & ISM
41 Lack of experience
42 Insufficient seamanship training
43 Inconsistency of fitness certificate
44 Improper coating operation
45 Insufficient & improper maintenance
46 Pushing limits of coating
47 leakage
48 Non-comprehensive monitoring
49 Insufficient number of screens
50 Unsuitable position of screens
51 Non-overlapping system
52 Sensor failure
53 Non-calibrated sensor
54 Unactivated alarm
55 Insufficient procedures
56 Violation of procedures
57 Lack of knowledge & experience
58 Insufficient training 
59 Incorrect operation 
VL L ML M MH H VH
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